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Human societies have a long history of incorporating elements of the past into the present; 
never more has this been the case than today. For centuries, if not millennia, creative artists 
and writers, architects and fashion designers, publicists and advertisers, have borrowed 
freely from the tangible and intangible heritage of other times and places (Figure 1). There is 
plentiful evidence of how fundamentally human achievement has depended on the 
transmission of knowledge across cultures. The technologies that shape our world are a 
case in point. Consider just one example: concrete, a technology we think of as distinctively 
modern – literally the building block of twenty-first-century society – was developed by both 
the Egyptians and the Romans thousands of years ago. In the context of increasingly rapid 
and global diffusion of tradition-specific images, ideas, and material culture, it is often a 
default assumption that ancient objects and images are elements of a shared legacy of 
humanity. 
Figure 1 
In this spirit, a growing contingent of scholars and activists aggressively defends the 
free flow of ideas, images, and knowledge – within and between societies, ancient and 
modern – on grounds that this is essential to innovation and creativity. Proponents of the 
Open Access and A2K (Access to Knowledge) movements speak of the importance of 
sharing the world’s vast knowledge, whereas scholars such as Laurence Lessig, James 
Boyle, and Kembow McLeod (among others) point to the stifling effects of restrictions on 
open exchange. Frequently, the advocates of open access draw attention to benefits that 
flow to the source communities and cultures (or their descendants), as well as to the 
recipients who draw inspiration from the cultural heritage of others. Even if economic benefits 
don’t flow equitably, so the argument goes, the open exchange of tradition-specific objects, 
practices, ideas, and knowledge may play an ambassadorial role, fostering cross-cultural 
understanding and respect. 
At the same time, even the most enthusiastic advocates of open exchange recognize 
that those who create new products, new music, new literature have rights that deserve 
recognition and protection, whatever their source of inspiration. Certainly, in Western society, 
unauthorized use of original work is prohibited, or at least limited, by copyright, patents, 
trademarks, and similar conventions that allow the creators to obtain benefit for a specified 
length of time.1 Despite the diversity of (conflicting) interests that figure in the contestation of 
these rights of ownership and fair use, there is shared understanding of what rights are at 
issue and broad recognition that they warrant protection; the challenge here is to find a 
balance between facilitating the flow of ideas and protecting the rights of creators. 
A much different type of challenge comes into focus when we consider the question 
of who should have access to or benefit from the tangible and intangible heritage of 
Indigenous societies both past and present, in which the values and interests at issue may 
be fundamentally different from those that find eloquent defense in the open-access debates. 
In the Americas, Africa, Australia, and many other regions, the lives and material culture of 
Indigenous peoples have long been the object of widespread public fascination. Once 
disparaged as primitives on the lowest rung of the evolutionary ladder, these neo–‘noble 
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savages’ have been a rich source of creative inspiration. Often emulated, commodified, and 
otherwise appropriated, their distinctive cultures have greatly enriched dominant societies in 
any number of senses, not just economically but also intellectually, technologically, culturally, 
and spiritually (e.g., Deloria 1998; Meyer and Royer 2001; Owen 2008; Rose 1992).2 And as 
the libertarian advocates of a global commons argue, this has not only opened up new 
creative possibilities in the borrowing society – innovative art forms and cultural practices that 
could only flourish in a context of cultural exchange – but has also brought various benefits to 
the source communities (e.g., Young and Brunk 2009; Young and Haley 2009). Most 
tangibly, indigenous art production has become a crucial source of revenue in some 
contexts; we explore here examples drawn from the giftware industry in the American 
Southwest (e.g., Bsumek 2008; Mullin 2001) and from the traditions of African sculpture and 
Australian Aboriginal painting that are highly prized objects of international trade and 
connoisseurship (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009; Isaacs 1992). More intangibly, when objects 
created for utilitarian and/or spiritual purposes in their original cultural setting are today 
exhibited as art of the highest caliber, the processes of trade and exchange that bring them 
to international attention foster an intercultural appreciation of cultures that had all too often 
been presumed to lack any serious artistic accomplishment. 
While acknowledging the benefits of cross-cultural exchange, it is important to 
recognize that they often come at a cost and that this cost has largely been borne by 
Indigenous peoples who have had little power, historically, to determine what uses are made 
of their cultural and intellectual property or to ensure that the benefits of exchange are 
reciprocal.3 There are any number of cases in which elements of indigenous culture – art, 
music, technical knowledge, spiritual practices, medicinal and culinary traditions – have been 
appropriated in ways that members of these cultures regard as inappropriate or unwelcome 
and that have caused harm of various kinds. Often enough, members of the appropriating 
culture have difficulty recognizing the harm they do; they may intend no harm, or indeed, 
they may operate with the best of intentions (e.g., Brown 2004; Johnson 1996; Nicholas and 
Bannister 2004a). But the fact remains that whatever their goals and sensibilities, their 
actions sometimes threaten cultural values and identity or undermine the economic interests, 
social relations, and other core elements of the communities whose cultural heritage they 
admiringly appropriate. 
In this chapter we explore two important questions that we believe should be central 
any discussion of the ethics and politics of cultural heritage: What are the harms associated 
with appropriation and commodification, specifically where the cultural heritage of Indigenous 
peoples is concerned? And how can these harms best be avoided? Archaeological concerns 
animate this discussion; we are ultimately concerned with fostering postcolonial 
archaeological practices. But we situate these questions in a broader context, addressing 
them as they arise in connection with the appropriation of Indigenous cultural heritage, both 
past and present. 
We begin by sketching a spectrum of harms, ranging from manifestly and sometimes 
deliberately harmful types of appropriation – cases of theft and dispossession, recognized as 
such by members of the appropriating culture – through to types of cultural exchange, 
emulation, and celebration of Indigenous cultures that typically are not considered pernicious 
forms of appropriation but may nonetheless cause harms of more subtle and inadvertent 
kinds. We then consider four cases that illustrate in concrete terms the interplay of harms 
and benefits and that bring into view a variety of responses to cultural appropriation, ranging 
from acceptance to protest. Our purpose is to identify (some of) the economic, social, 
cultural, and spiritual costs of cultural appropriation in cases in which one dimension of the 
problem is that the interests and sensibilities of members of the source community are 
systematically misrecognized by those who appropriate elements of their cultural heritage. In 
developing this analysis we presuppose that there may be fundamental differences in the 
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worldview, legal regimes, and cultural norms that underpin Indigenous conceptions of 
heritage and those characteristic of the dominant (Euro-American-derived) Northern and 
Western societies that have displaced and colonized them. In particular, many Indigenous 
and non-Western societies do not recognize the distinctions between tangible and intangible 
heritage presupposed by much (Western) legal and philosophical discussion of cultural 
appropriation. The material elements of heritage, such as artifacts, archaeological sites, or 
places, cannot be separated from the knowledge, beliefs, and stories associated with them; 
ancestral beings and supernatural forces may be understood to reside in material things and 
places, not only in the past but also still today. In these cases a lot more than economic 
value, or historical and archaeological significance, is at stake for Indigenous peoples when 
heritage sites are threatened or when traditional objects, images, and knowledge are used in 
inappropriate and unwelcome ways. The challenge is not just to balance competing claims 
but also to understand claims predicated on conceptions of value and harm that may diverge 
quite fundamentally. 
In our concluding section, we turn to the question of how such harms can be avoided 
or mitigated. We focus, in particular, on one approach – community-based participatory 
research (CBPR) – that creates a context in which source communities can identify and 
convey their appreciation of the harms associated with the appropriation of their cultural 
heritage, and a process that may enable researchers to engage in more ethical and 
responsible practices in relation to these communities. 
“Do not do unto others . . .”: Kinds and Degrees of Harm 
In a general sense, appropriation may be defined simply as the use and retention of 
something without permission. We use the term in this generic sense; the questions of 
whether a particular instance of use is appropriative and whether (or to what degree) it is 
harmful or beneficial must be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis with attention to the 
contexts and history of cultural exchange in which it occurs. Central to this conception of 
appropriation is the insight that it involves intentional decontextualization (Meurer and 
Coombe 2009: 21). In some cases, the repurposed use of images and ideas has morphed 
into familiar tropes in the literary and artistic traditions or cultural discourse of the recipient 
society; what was once appropriated has been recontextualized. A particular instance of 
appropriation becomes problematic when “a cultural text is improperly recontextualized, to 
the outrage or injury of those who have serious attachments to its repositioning in specific 
worlds of social meaning” (Meurer and Coombe 2009: 21, emphasis in original). Recognizing 
that what counts as injury and what occasions outrage may vary widely is vital to 
characterizing the harms that can be done by appropriation, especially when cultural heritage 
is central to a person’s (or a society’s) well-being.4 There are various ways in which elements 
of cultural heritage may be (and have been) appropriated – by purchase or trade, through 
discovery (accidental or otherwise) and indirect influence, as well as through forcible 
alienation – all of which may prove enriching for one or both parties but may also cause harm 
depending on history and context. 
The starkest and, in a sense, the most straightforward cases of harm are examples 
of theft or forcible appropriation that are acknowledged as harmful by the appropriating 
community or, indeed, may be deliberately intended to harm. For example, in the nineteenth 
century, the British Army led retributive raids in Benin and Ethiopia, capturing large 
collections of antiquities and other items of cultural significance (Waxman 2008; Young 2008: 
19–21). In the early twentieth century, ceremonial regalia and masks of Northwest coastal 
tribes were confiscated by the Canadian government in an effort to prohibit the potlatch5; 
these items of cultural patrimony subsequently became the foundation for a number of major 
museum collections (Cole and Chaikin 1990; Simpson 2001). Such instances are, sadly, not 
uncommon in the history of the colonial enterprise worldwide. Adding insult to injury, the 
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harm done by the forcible removal of highly prized antiquities was often compounded by 
colonial programs of archaeological research that purported to demonstrate that the 
ancestors of local populations could not possibly have produced such cultural treasures (e.g., 
Zimbabwe in southern Africa; the mounds and earthworks of eastern North America). 
Indigenous source cultures were thus stripped of tangible cultural heritage in a way that both 
reinforced entrenched prejudices about their cultural sophistication or technological capacity 
and provided a retrospective justification for appropriation. 
A short step from outright theft or wartime appropriation are the various strategies, 
well documented by Indigenous scholars, by which the members of dominant cultures have 
subverted or manipulated their own legal and political conventions to justify acts of 
appropriation that would otherwise have been clearly judged unjust and/or illegal. Consider, 
for example, Laurie Anne Whitt’s (1998a, 1998b) classic assessment of the ways fictions of 
absence have been used to legitimate legal manipulations by which Indigenous peoples 
have been dispossessed of their land, and then their material culture, intellectual property, 
and medical and/or biogenetic resources (see also Whitt 1999). Whitt argues that 
appropriation turns on two reinforcing claims, especially clearly articulated in connection with 
territorial rights:6 first, a declaration that the land Europeans encountered in the Americas, 
Australia, and elsewhere was unoccupied – that it was terra nullius – usually accomplished 
by fiat of European definitions of what counts as occupation and/or by forcible displacement 
of Aboriginal peoples; and second, a conversion of this definitionally public property into 
private or individual property. She makes the point that “the politics of property has never 
been confined to land” and considers how the same strategies structure conflicts over the 
ownership of indigenous music and, “genetic wealth and pharmaceutical knowledge,” and, 
indeed, the archaeological debates about repatriation (1998b: 149, 153). These are replete 
with examples in which the age of items, uncertainty about their attribution to living cultural 
traditions, or their affiliation with specific descendant communities are used to establish the 
claim that valued elements of these traditions – everything from spiritual traditions, rock-art 
designs, and artifact styles to technical knowledge and human remains – can be treated as 
“public domain” (Nicholas in press), available for the taking to anyone enterprising enough to 
make use of them. 
A different scenario arises when, in retrospect, the ostensibly legal purchase or trade 
of heritage items proves problematic: the conditions of sale were coercive; the seller did not 
have a right to alienate the items either because he or she did not own them, or they were 
items of group patrimony and there was no consensus empowering the sale or consensus 
changed. One of the best-known examples of this was the removal of major architectural 
elements of Parthenon in 1802 by Thomas Bruce, the Seventh Earl of Elgin. Although it 
appears that Bruce greatly overstepped the intent of the permit he obtained from the 
Ottoman sultan to “remove some pieces with inscriptions or figures” (Browning 2008: 11), 
and his actions were contested at the time in Britain (in parliamentary committee hearings) 
as well as by the local Athenian population, the so-called Elgin Marbles have been a 
centerpiece of the British Museum for almost two hundred years. The official stance of both 
the museum and the British government continues to be that these marbles were legally 
obtained.7 Comparable issues arise in connection with the purchase from Indigenous 
peoples of the extensive inventories of masks, regalia, carvings, and other secular and 
sacred items still housed in museums in Australia, Canada, the United States, and elsewhere 
(e.g., Coles 1985).8 In recent decades, following the success of several high-profile 
repatriation cases, many museums are increasingly responsive to repatriation claims and 
explore options for sharing ownership, developing collaborative programs of exhibition. 
Issues relating to the appropriation and repatriation of Southwestern ethnographic 
materials are particularly interesting in this context, ranging from the issues surrounding the 
Ahayu:da (war god) carved by ethnographer Frank Cushing, who was an initiated member of 
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the Zuni Priesthood of the Bow (Isaac 2011: 218), to the information collected by Elsie Crews 
Parsons at Laguna Pueblo later “fictionalized” by Leslie Marmon Silko, herself Laguna 
(Nelson 2001), to concerns over the use of photographs of Zia Pueblo in museums and other 
contexts (e.g., Holman 1996). Gwyneira Isaac’s (2011) recent examination of Zuni principles 
relating to the intangible aspects of cultural patrimony and the reproduction of the knowledge 
contained therein is essential reading here. Notable is William Merrill’s statement (cited in 
Isaac 2011: 219) regarding the authenticity of “replicas,” such as Cushing’s: “From the Zuni 
perspective the fact that Cushing might have produced the Ahayu:da is irrelevant to its 
authenticity. Their position is that anything produced on the basis of Zuni knowledge (and 
especially Zuni religious knowledge) ultimately belongs to the people of Zuni, even if 
produced by non-Indians; for them there is no such thing as a ‘replica’ or ‘model.’” 
Beyond these are cases in which appropriation seems uncontroversially legal in the 
terms set by dominant Western legal conventions but harm of various kinds is done to the 
source communities nonetheless. There are numerous cases in which medical and genetic 
researchers have obtained permission from Indigenous peoples to record traditional 
knowledge and collect biological samples but have exceeded the bounds of the original study 
and agreements associated with it. Well-publicized examples include the Nuu-chal-nuth 
blood study in British Columbia (Cybulski 2001) and the case of the Haghai of Papua New 
Guinea in which researchers sought patents on cell lines (World Intellectual Property 
Organization 2006).9 Even when there are legal mechanisms, like copyright or patents, that 
Indigenous communities could use to protect elements of their traditional heritage that have 
value in the dominant culture, until recently Indigenous communities have made little use of 
them. This should not be surprising; the nuances of intellectual property law are daunting 
even for those who are familiar it,10 but often enough Indigenous communities do not share 
the conceptions of property or commoditized value that underpin this legal regime.11 Their 
music or art or, indeed, land and biogenetic profile, never seemed the kind of thing that 
should require legal protection.12 
Increasingly, Indigenous peoples are interested in the information that can be 
derived from the genetic analysis of ancestral remains and modern samples, and from 
archaeological studies of heritage sites and artifacts (e.g., Nicholas et al. 2008), to take just 
two examples. But they want to be involved in decisions about what will be studied, how 
research will be conducted, and how the resulting information will be used. One of the central 
challenges they face is that historically they have lacked the means to ensure that they will 
benefit from the use of their heritage by others; they do not have the means to institute the 
necessary legal protections, and they may not be in a position to realize the benefits of such 
protection. A case in point from British Columbia concerns ethnobotanist Kelly Bannister 
(2000) and her doctoral research on the role of plants in traditional medicine, and the 
biochemical and pharmacological properties of balsamroot (Balsamorhiza sagittata). To 
protect the traditional knowledge of the Shuswap Nation Tribal Council with whom she was 
working, Bannister codeveloped a protocol with the Skeetchestn Indian Band that governed 
aspects of her work. Because of the potential economic interests and commercial 
applications of her research results, she subsequently obtained from her university a five-
year restriction on public access to her dissertation; this was designed to ensure that the 
Secwepemc Nation would have the opportunity to pursue proprietary interests in applications 
of these results, if they so desired. Although this afforded some protection from 
bioprospecting – this is a case in which the Indigenous community could establish a right to 
control and profit from its traditional knowledge in terms that have legal standing in the 
dominant community – the time and resources required to develop viable products were far 
beyond their means. 
By contrast, there are cases in which the heritage in question is not recognized in the 
dominant culture (or legal system) as a type of property that could be legally protected,13 or 
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more prosaically, its significance for the source community presupposes values and 
concepts that have no cultural salience or legal standing in the dominant, appropriating 
community. Especially troubling are cases in which harm is done, even by those who operate 
from the best of intentions – for example, artists who admiringly emulate Indigenous design 
traditions; collectors who are deeply appreciative of Indigenous material culture; 
archaeologists who painstakingly investigate sites and artifacts with the aim of understanding 
Indigenous cultural traditions – because they lack the understanding necessary to know what 
it is they’re appropriating and what the impact is of their appropriation. These include 
examples of harm done by appropriation that is meant to honor Indigenous peoples (see 
Aldred 2000; Brown 2004; Meyer and Royer 2001; Nicholas and Bannister 2004a, b). Clearly 
specifying and communicating what is at stake across these kinds of cultural divide becomes 
especially challenging when Indigenous peoples are themselves divided on questions of 
appropriate use. To draw an example from the American Southwest, a central element of 
traditional Navajo healing ceremonies is the practice of creating elaborate paintings of holy 
people and other supernatural entities using colored sand on the ground. These sand 
paintings become “impermanent alters where ritual activities can take place,” but most 
important, they are also full of power, and for that reason, they are erased after the healing 
ceremony is concluded (Parezo 1983: 1). This practice continues today, but alongside other 
far more secular uses of sand paintings, which include the creation of permanent versions for 
sale to tourists: 
Although some Navajos were upset at first when individuals violated religious taboos 
by making sandpaintings in a permanent form outside their ceremonial context, the 
Navajo community was never totally united against their production. By the late 
1970s many Navajos recognized the existence of both sacred and secular 
sandpaintings. But the road to acceptance of this dichotomy had many twists and 
turns. From the first, reaction ranged from indifference to violent opposition. Reasons 
for the opposition varied widely. Some felt that a sacrilege was being committed and 
the paintings were bring treated irreverently; some feared supernatural 
repercussions, for to break a rule is to disrupt harmonious relationships with the deity 
which would probably, but not necessarily, cause trouble. Others did not fear for 
themselves but objected because the uninitiated could see the paintings or view 
them in the wrong season. Still others feared for the Anglo recorders who were 
unprotected but in continue contact with concentrated power. (Parezo 1983: 63) 
Finally, even when Indigenous peoples freely share aspects of their culture with others, 
recipients may be unwilling to accept that these gifts come with important limitations (Irwin 
2000; Owen 2008). Admiring outsiders who draw inspiration from Indigenous spiritual 
traditions may not realize the harm they do when enacting, or representing these traditions, 
and they may be surprised and offended when objections are raised. For example: 
At a 1986 benefit concert staged to raise funds to support the efforts of traditional 
Navajos resisting forcible relocation from their homes around Big Mountain, Arizona, 
one non-Indian performer took the opportunity between each of her songs to 
“explain” one or another element of “Navajo religion” to the audience. Her 
presumption in this regard deeply offended several Navajos in attendance and, 
during an intermission, she was quietly told to refrain from any further commentary. 
She thereupon returned to the stage and announced that her performance was over 
and that she was withdrawing her support to the Big Mountain struggle because the 
people of that area were “oppressing” her through denial of her “right” to serve as a 
self-appointed spokesperson for their spirituality. “I have,” she said, “just as much 
right to spiritual freedom as they do.” (Churchill 1998: 103) 
In short, when considered from the perspective of the source culture, significant harm may 
be done by cultural appropriation even when no harm is intended or recognized in the 
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dominant culture. This brings home the prosaic wisdom that the golden rule, in its 
conventional form,14 is not necessarily a good guide to action in contexts of cultural 
exchange or appropriation. Given the cultural differences that may be involved, especially 
where the relationship between tangible and intangible property is concerned, it is dangerous 
to assume that your sensibilities about what constitutes respect and appropriate use will be a 
reliable guide to whether or not a given instance of cultural appropriation is harmless. It is 
especially dangerous to ignore the possibility that what you regard as an innocuous, 
acceptable, or even laudable use of elements drawn from another’s cultural tradition, may, in 
fact, be profoundly offensive; may undermine economic well-being and social relations 
tangible ways; or may threaten identity and cultural integrity. It is crucial, then, to consider the 
significance of objects of appropriation in the context of their source traditions, which, in turn, 
requires a commitment to respectfully learn about Indigenous worldviews, customary laws, 
and values. 
A Consideration of Four Cases: When Appropriation Harms and When It Does Not 
As the spectrum of harm outlined in the previous section makes clear, cultural appropriation 
is by no means a unified phenomenon, and neither are its benefits or its harms.15 Indeed, 
because not all uses of heritage (without permission) constitute appropriation in a negative 
sense, it is important to explore examples that illustrate the complicated interplay of good 
intentions and inadvertent harm. The cases presented in this section further illustrate why we 
need to move beyond appeals to good intentions and the constraints of legality in assessing 
the harms and benefits of cultural appropriation; the first set of examples are ones in which 
inappropriate or unwelcome uses of cultural heritage cause various kinds of harm, and the 
second set draws attention to cases that seem to be appropriative in a negative sense but on 
closer examination may not be. They are chosen to illustrate common themes that arise in 
contexts ranging from entertainment to economics, and from cultural tourism to ancestor 
celebration, and to suggest strategies by which we might more effectively recognize and 
constructively respond to harms that are not necessarily salient in our home culture. 
When Appropriations Harm 
Wanjina-Wunggurr Rock Art. One of the most widely appropriated aspects of cultural 
heritage is rock art, which not only garners attention from both academics and the public for 
the insights it provides into ancient and/or exotic worldviews but also serves as a source of 
images for a variety of commercial products, from T-shirts and mugs to high-end designer 
clothing and art. However, the inappropriate use of these images has had a direct and 
negative impact on these indigenous communities precisely because the tangible image 
cannot be separated from its intangible associations. Not only do they represent clan 
property; they may quite literally embody ancestral spirits, and in this they are not “of the 
past” but have a timeless significance; they are a vital part of a living cultural tradition, 
constitutive of the identity and spirituality of these communities. 
This is the case in Australia, for example, where rock art has been widely 
commercialized and has also been prominent in cultural tourism. Customary law has long 
served as the means to limit access to (indeed viewing of) various images, thus ensuring 
their protection, but this is challenged by outside interests. As Janke and Quiggin (2005: 8) 
note, “Within Indigenous Australian groups, there are consistent principles underlying the 
ownership, cultural integrity and consent procedures. However, the Australian legal 
framework limits the ability of Indigenous people to adequately protect their [Indigenous 
cultural and intellectual property] from exploitation by outsiders.”16 
In the rock-art-rich Kimberley region of northern Australia, the Wanjina-Wunggurr 
people find themselves challenged by the rapidly expanding cultural tourism industry. Here, 
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their concern is for the well-being of renowned wanjina pictographs, which they consider 
animate; the paintings are the embodiment of the creator beings who formed the land, the 
laws, and customs of these people. These images continue to be “freshened up” by 
repainting to keep the world right. As Graber (2009: 18) observes: 
The rapid expansion of tourism in this region is considered to be a new threat to the 
sacred rock art sites. Many tourists travel to the area expecting to see the Wanginas 
as promised in the advertisements. The Wanjina-Wunggurr people, however, fear 
that unauthorised visits may offend the Wanjinas [ancestral beings] and that tourists 
will vandalize the sacred sites. The Wanjina-Wunggurr people are thus interested in 
legal remedies that prevent the Wanjina from being visited and reproduced, and 
sacred rituals from being disturbed by people who have not received their prior 
consent. Consequently, during the [native title application] proceedings, the 
applicants put forward a claim for a right to prevent inappropriate viewing, hearing or 
reproduction of secret ceremonies, artwork, song cycles and sacred narratives. 
The significance of these concerns is illustrated by an incident that occurred in a session on 
intellectual property that one of us (GN) co-organized at 2008 World Archaeological 
Congress conference in Dublin. One of the participants gave a presentation on her research 
on rock art in the Kimberley region that included photographs of the sites and images she 
was describing (including those she took while accompanied by local Aboriginal community 
members and from published sources). In the question period an Aboriginal man from that 
region who was in the audience strenuously objected that this violated fundamental cultural 
guidelines of access: “How dare you show these images! I could be killed by my community 
for having seen these!” Although Indigenous peoples may welcome scholarship that 
recognizes the richness of their cultural traditions and are involved with or themselves 
undertake to develop cultural tourism for a variety of reasons, including economic benefit 
(see Mortensen and Nicholas 2010), the Wangina-Wunggurr example makes it clear that 
some aspects of their cultural heritage may need to remain off-limits to avoid harm to 
themselves, to visitors, and to ancestral beings. 
The 2010 Winter Olympics. The Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) of the 2010 
Winter Olympics ostensibly went to great lengths to include Canadian First Nations in various 
events, including the opening ceremonies. Their participation was considered a vital element 
in presenting and promoting Canadian heritage, and many First Nations individuals and 
groups also saw this as a celebration of their culture; the four host First Nations17 – Lil’wat, 
Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh – were official partners of VANOC and had, at 
least nominally, a role in decision making involving Aboriginal issues. At the same time, the 
games were marked by protest and controversy by other First Nations groups and persons 
who objected to the games as a whole or to what they considered exploitative use of First 
Nations presence to showcase the games, with little or no meaningful participation in 
decision making (e.g., O’Bonawain 2006). Three examples of how indigenous heritage was 
incorporated into the games makes it clear that there were economic and other benefits to 
First Nations, but these were accompanied by various harms. 
Inuksuit (singular, inukshuk) are the standing stone arrangements, sometimes 
anthropomorphic in form, found across the Arctic landscape that have been created by Inuit 
hunters likely for millennia. A stylized version of an inukshuk was adopted by VANOC as the 
logo for the 2010 winter games, with permission granted from Nunavut premier Paul Okalik. 
However, not all Inuit were in agreement. As a result of the use of the widespread use of the 
image, particularly on thousands of Olympics-related products, the inukshuk have lost much 
of their cultural specialness and have become both common and emblematic of Canada and 
the Vancouver Olympics in the public imagination rather than of Inuit culture. The stylized 
Olympics image has also, as noted by Solen Roth, “contributed to crystallizing one particular 
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kind of rock formation as the archetypical inukshuk.” Finally, the choice of the symbol was 
puzzling to many, as it had nothing to do with British Columbian First Nations: as noted by 
O’Bonawain (2006: 389), “Squamish hereditary chief Gerald Johnston publicly condemned 
the [International Olympic Committee’s] selection of the inukshuk logo by declaring that its 
choice was in bad faith, a deliberate act of assault on Northwest Coast sovereignty, and the 
symbol of a foreign indigenous nation.” These examples reveal that a variety of harms may 
occur when a cultural item becomes a popular icon, as well as concerns over the production 
of, and benefits from, the giftware. At the same time, many Inuit felt pride in the recognition of 
their heritage, especially the arts and crafts. In addition, some carvers and communities 
benefited directly from the manufacture and sale of handmade inukshuk through an 
agreement made between the Nunavut Development Corporation and VANOC (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2010). 
Another cultural controversy erupted during the Olympics when the Russian figure-
skating team performed their routine wearing costumes based on traditional Aboriginal 
Australian body painting and faux didgeridoo music. Bev Manton, of the New South Wales 
Land Council, stated, “I am offended by the performance and so are our other councilors.” 
Seeming bewildered by this hostile response, Maxim Shabalin, one of the Russian skaters, 
defended this appropriation of Aboriginal heritage with the statement: “We researched a lot of 
information on the Internet.”18 The suggestion seems to be both that they intended no 
disrespect and that what they appropriated was nonproprietary – available in the most public 
of public domain contexts. Beyond controversy about what is or is not public domain, and 
what constitutes fair use of publically accessible information, what Manton points out is that, 
from the point of the source community, this was clearly an instance of appropriation in the 
negative sense: it involved use without permission in which elements were taken out of 
context and inappropriately recontextualized. It was, moreover, an instance of harmful 
appropriation, threatening the integrity of Aboriginal culture by transforming it into a form of 
popular entertainment. 
A final example is the marketing of First Nations culture at the Olympic Games and 
issues of economic harm. In one case, a lucrative contract was awarded to a leading 
department store to produce sweaters initially described as “Cowichan-like,” in relation to the 
regionally distinctive style of the Cowichan people; these sweaters were to be worn by the 
Canadian Olympic team and sold to the public. This decision was a stunning upset for the 
Cowichan First Nation, who have long produced these sweaters and had submitted a bid that 
was lower than that of the department store. This immediately elicited the threat that the 
Cowichan First Nation and their supporters would stage high-profile protests in the lead-up to 
the Games.19 In the end, a settlement was negotiated that provided the Cowichan First 
Nation a contract to sell their sweaters in the department store, alongside the official Olympic 
ones, by then described as “Canada’s answer to the Nordic sweater.” This was, however, 
just one of a number of cases that mobilized protests from the First Nations about the 
practice of outsourcing the production of “Authentic Aboriginal Products” endorsed by 
VANOC. In response, a group of First Nations artists and artisans created their own 
authenticating mark to identify their creations (Brown and Nicholas 2010).20 
When Appropriation Does Not Harm 
Although the use of another’s culture without permission and in inappropriate ways may be 
profoundly harmful, as the previous examples make clear, not all cultural borrowings 
constitute appropriation in this negative sense. As we acknowledged at the outset, cultural 
sharing and exchange may be enormously enriching; insights drawn from lives lived in 
different ways, at other times and in other places, are a rich source of inspiration on any 
number of dimensions. In the cases that follow, we consider how one society has benefited 
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from unattributed archaeological heritage and how the commodification archaeological 
heritage in another honors its ancestors. 
Mata Ortiz Pottery. The appropriation of various elements of Puebloan and other indigenous 
heritage the Southwestern United States has been an established practice from the time of 
contact, for several hundred years. Images or representations of katchinas, wooden figurines 
that represent supernatural beings, and of Kokopelli, the flute player, adorn mailboxes, 
jewelry, clothing, and other products.21 At the very least, the popularity of indigenous motifs, 
coupled with the cheaper prices for replicas, continues to foreground issues of authenticity 
and economic loss. 
But by contrast to the appropriation of the sun symbol from the pottery from Zia 
Pueblo,22 the example of Mata Ortiz is a case in which an ancient pottery style has inspired a 
new artistic movement that benefits Indigenous peoples economically and culturally. In the 
mid-1950s, a young man from Nuevos Casas Grandes in Chihuahua, Mexico, was inspired 
by pottery sherds from the archaeological site of Casas Grandes (Townsend 2005). Juan 
Quezada taught himself to produce pottery inspired by this ancient ceramic tradition. What 
resulted was a new, community-wide pottery movement that has gained international 
attention.23 Quezada and the ceramic artists he inspired set out to create an innovative, 
consistent visual language that was distinct from that of their predecessors or 
contemporaries and while incorporating some similar, recognizably Southwestern decorative 
and symbolic elements. The resulting ceramic style (Figure 2) reflects a conscious effort at 
self-determination, articulating the identity of a new polity but in visual terms that would be 
accessible to and understandable throughout the region; those working in this style are 
moving beyond traditional forms to experiment with new pottery designs and other media. In 
this case there are no Southwestern groups who make specific claim to Casas Grandes, 
apart from the recognition that it falls within the general culture region (Maccallum 1978); it is 
an instance of inspiration in which Indigenous peoples derived direct benefit, initially creating 
beautiful and highly desirable replicas of ceramic designs associated with earlier (and likely 
unrelated) traditions, and then expanding in new artistic directions. 
Figure 2 
Tollund Man. One of the most haunting images found in archaeological publications is of the 
Tollund Man, a two-thousand-year-old individual whose body was extraordinarily well 
preserved in a wetland environment in Denmark. Photographs of this individual are widely 
available in archaeological publications and other sources, including being featured in the 
British comedy series Blunder. In an earlier publication, one of us (GN) had suggested that 
descendants might be offended by the use of his image in advertising, such as for “Moor 
Mud” facial cleanser and other products.24 This concern reflected experience with Indigenous 
peoples and the concerns that they and others raise about cultural sensitivity regarding 
human remains,25 but it proved unfounded in the case of the Tollund Man. 
Recent conversations and correspondence with Danish colleagues, Ulla Odgaard 
and Mille Gabriel, shed important light on the broader context in which these uses of the 
image of Tollund Man take place. In response to a query about this case, Odgaard, of the 
Danish National Museum, wrote: 
The Danish people are proud of the Tollund man. Novels have been written about 
this peacefully looking person, who died a (probably) ritual death in the moor. I asked 
Mille Gabriel [curator at the Ethnographic Department, who recently finished a PhD 
on repatriation and first people’s rights26] about her feelings towards this commercial. 
She answered that in her opinion “this commercial is not deliberately making fun of 
the Tollund man, but rather appropriates him as evidence for the apparently good 
influence of the mud on his skin. The conservational qualities of the mud are 
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presented in an almost natural scientific manner, which is something Danes 
generally can relate to and appreciate.” In Denmark, we are used to see dead bodies 
on display in the museums, and the most famous of those are our most important 
links to the past – they are our ancestors. From childhood we learn about the Tollund 
man (on display at Silkeborg Museum), the Gravballe man (on display at Moesgård 
Museum and the Egtved girl (on display here at the museum). They give prehistory 
more “presence.” (Personal communication 2011) 
This example illustrates the central point that context matters; the fact that the appropriation 
of Tollund Man involves explicit commercialization of his image does not necessarily entail it 
being disrespectful. Substantial and perhaps surprising variability exists in the manner in 
which societies approach and utilize their heritage, including the bones and bodies of their 
ancestors. Whether an instance of appropriation is harmful depends on the sensibilities of 
both the source and the recipient culture, where these establish norms of significance that 
determine the propriety of a recontextualization. 
How Can Harm Be Avoided? 
A necessary starting point for avoiding harm is to understand how and why cultural 
appropriation can cause harm. In the previous sections we have identified examples of 
appropriation that illustrate some of the ways in which it can cause social, spiritual, or 
economic harm, especially to Indigenous peoples for whom tangible and intangible heritage 
may be indivisible. We now turn to consider the potential of community-based heritage 
research as a process through which affected communities and concerned researchers can 
develop the kind of intercultural understanding that will put them in a position to recognize 
and avoid the kinds of harm we have highlighted here. 
Generally, responses to cultural appropriation are reactive; those who perceive or 
experience harm attempt to block the uses of their heritage they find insulting or injurious 
and, in some cases, to seek restitution (e.g., Howes 1995). The challenges here are 
exacerbated by the limited protection available for many aspects of cultural heritage. A 
proactive approach is likely to be more effective because it focuses on preventing harm 
rather than repairing the damage. And a community-based collaborative approach is 
especially promising because it builds into the core of a heritage management or research 
program questions about how participating and affected parties conceptualize potential 
benefits and harms, and how these might best be addressed. 
Community-based participatory research (CBPR) developed out of social- or 
participatory-based research methodology that not only engages the community fully in the 
process but also works to ensure that they are primary beneficiaries (Wadsworth 1998). Well 
established in fields as diverse as public health, forestry, sociology, and anthropology, CBPR 
is making inroads in heritage studies as a way to ensure that the research is, from the start, 
designed to be relevant, respectful, and beneficial (Atalay 2012; Hollowell and Nicholas 
2009: 147). Although CBPR takes many different forms, an integral aspect of such projects is 
a commitment to learn about core community values and concerns through consultation, 
interviews, focus groups, ethnographic study, and ongoing consultation; this is the basis for 
defining research goals and designing a research process that puts the concerns of affected 
communities these at the center of the process (e.g., Bell and Napoleon 2008). 
A CBPR methodology is utilized in a series of community-based research initiatives 
being undertaken by the Intellectual Property Issues in Cultural Heritage (IPinCH) project.27 
This international consortium is investigating how and why concerns and harms about 
intellectual property emerge, and how best can they be avoided or resolved. The case study 
component of the project involves community-designed studies to investigate local issues 
from the ground up. Here are two examples of projects that target cultural harm. 
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One IPinCH study developed in northern Canada by the Avataq Cultural Institute is 
organized around the question, how can Inuit language and culture be preserved in the 
context of cultural tourism? The indigenous Nunavimmiut people understand the need to 
strengthen their identity and develop a strong economic basis for the region. However, there 
is a danger that increased economic benefits of cultural tourism will have a negative impact 
on the cultural identity. The ultimate objective to make sure that tourism is not developed 
without community involvement and that it corresponds to what the Inuit want to share about 
their lives and their land (Gendron et al. 2010). 
Another study focuses on ezhibiigaadek asin (Sanilac Petroglyph Site), a historic 
park containing more than one hundred petroglyphs that is administered by the state of 
Michigan. For Saginaw Chippewa people, this is a sacred place. As project leader Sonya 
Atalay notes: 
One of the petroglyphs at the Sanilac site depicts an archer. Oral traditions tell us 
that this archer depicts our ancestors shooting knowledge into the future for later 
generations to benefit. These images were recorded on stone because our 
ancestors knew a time would come when our language, traditions, and practices 
would be threatened by colonization – carving knowledge on stone ensured 
permanence. Caring for this place and for the knowledge held there are both part of 
traditional knowledge stewardship practices. (Atalay et al. 2008: 2) 
The challenge for the Saginaw Chippewa Ziibiwing Cultural Center is to develop a 
comanagement plan with the state of Michigan that recognizes the inseparable tangible and 
intangible aspects of this place. They would like to share this traditional place with multiple 
public audiences while protecting the knowledge and images from being co-opted and 
appropriated. Concerns about avoiding harm to this place are revealed in community values. 
For example, the roof erected over the petroglyphs to “protect” them is considered damaging 
because the rain can no longer cleanse the images; tribal women now do this so the power 
that resides in these images is renewed (Figure 3), and they encourage their children to 
crawl on the images. Also, two tribal members who sought permission to use the image of 
the archer (noted earlier) for the logo of their sporting goods store were told that such use 
was inappropriate. 
Figure 3  
These two examples make it clear, first, that local and Indigenous communities are 
often interested in engaging with the wider world but on their own terms and in ways that 
preserve cultural values and, second, that what counts as heritage and what constitutes its 
proper use or protection may vary widely. In particular, there are fundamental differences in 
how Western and non-Western societies conceptualize cultural heritage that affect how they 
use or protect tangible and intangible property. Understanding this is the necessary starting 
point for effective and satisfying heritage management. 
In the absence of effective legal mechanisms to protect intangible cultural heritage, 
emphasizing cross-cultural understanding of community needs and concerns may be the 
only option available. The legal protections that exist typically only extend to those aspects of 
cultural heritage have equivalents in Western society (e.g., registering tribal designs to limit 
unauthorized use). There is currently little protection for traditional knowledge, such as is 
embodied in stories or clothing design (see Brown and Nicholas 2010). Some Indigenous 
groups have developed policies and protocols that identify their concerns to outside 
researchers and others, thus providing practical protection for their heritage. One example of 
this is the Protocol for Research, Publication and Recordings developed by the Hopi 
Nation.28 Another is the IPinCH project under way with the Penobscot Indian Nation of Maine 
that combines the tribal community voice and knowledge with ethnographic, archaeological 
and legal information to create policies, procedures and protocols that protect the Nation's 
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intellectual property associated with their cultural landscape, while maintaining compliance 
with state and federal historic preservation and cultural resource management laws and 
regulations. Included in this plan are intellectual property and cultural sensitivity training 
workshops for outside archaeologists and researchers. The Penobscot Nation has 
established a community-based Intellectual Property Working Group to identify aspects of 
their heritage that are particularly sensitive and is creating a formalized tribal structure to 
address these and other research-related issues.  
 Discussion and Conclusions 
In the context of archaeological practice, there has been growing awareness of the legacy of 
colonialism, manifest in the limited meaningful participation of descendant communities, and 
the outflow of cultural capital from descendant communities (Denzin et al. 2008; Hollowell 
and Nicholas 2009). One response has been to develop more culturally appropriate and 
meaningful research methods (Atalay 2012; Denzin et al. 2008; Smith 1999), including 
Indigenous archaeology and related community-based archaeological approaches (Colwell-
Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2008; Nicholas 2008; Smith and Wobst 2005). To ensure that 
research not only causes no harm but also is relevant and beneficial to the communities, 
these initiatives emphasize the need for ongoing negotiation and draw inspiration from virtue 
ethics and debate in other contexts about the implications of concepts of stewardship and 
various formulations of the precautionary principle.29 They are predicated on an appreciation 
that we must learn to recognize the limitations of our own conceptual frameworks; the harms 
of appropriation can be identified and avoided only if the insularity of the golden rule is 
counteracted by robust cross-cultural communication. 
We identify three promising theoretical, philosophical resources that may be useful in 
addressing the challenges. One is recent discussion of the demands of cross-cultural 
communication in the literature on deliberative democracy, where, for example, Brandon 
Morgan-Olsen (2010) suggests that conventional (Rawlsian) requirements of public 
deliberation put considerable burden on those whose values, reasons for action, or 
justification for a policy recommendation derive from a minority culture; they are put in the 
position of translating their insights into terms that are legible in the dominant culture. 
Morgan-Olsen argues that there should be explicit recognition of the responsibilities of 
listeners, not just speakers; listeners should be accountable for extending themselves, 
finding ways to understand and translate reasons, interests, and concerns that are not 
familiar. We see in this discussion resources for characterizing the obligations of dominant 
culture interlocutors (e.g., researchers, heritage managers) and strategies by which culturally 
sensitive questions about the harms and benefits of cultural appropriation may be addressed. 
Related insights come from the feminist and critical race theory literature on 
epistemic violence and epistemic injustice (e.g., Delgado and Stefancic 2001; Spivak 1998; 
Fricker 2007; Wylie 2005, 2011). Members of minority cultures or people who are marginal in 
other ways routinely confront systematic patterns of misrecognition of at least two kinds (as 
characterized by Fricker 2007): testimonial injustice, by which they are not recognized as 
credible knowers and/or speakers; and hermeneutical injustice, by which they find the 
dominant culture lacks the conceptual resources to articulate key elements of their 
experience. Recent analyses detail a range of related mechanisms by which the distinctive 
experience, analysis, and insights of marginalized knowers are silenced (e.g., contributors to 
a Hypatia cluster on epistemic justice, edited by Wylie [2011]: Dotson, Lee, Mason, Gilson). 
Just these sorts of mechanisms are at work in the persistent denial or misrecognition of the 
harms of cultural appropriation; the strategies for counteracting epistemic silencing and 
misrecognition that are explored in this literature may be a rich resource for developing 
constructive, proactive responses to the challenges of cultural appropriation. 
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Finally, the work of James Tully on intercultural constitutional negotiation converges 
on, and would seem to capture, the underlying rationale of practices that have been instituted 
by archaeologists and Indigenous peoples who are engaged in productive collaborations. 
Tully (1995: 116) observes that negotiation should begin with a recognition of difference, not 
the presumption that difference obscures an underlying (rational, universal) framework that is 
neutral with respect to diverse cultural values. One of us (AW) has summarized key aspects 
of Tully’s work that seem applicable in archaeology in these terms: 
The need for this kind of communication – for the kind of sustained engagement 
necessary to build trust and understanding, [mutual recognition,] sometimes across 
acrimonious differences – is pivotal to virtually every recommendation for 
collaboration that has been made by Native Americans and archaeologists alike. 
Beyond this, Tully outlines a process by which negotiating parties articulate for one 
another just what identity-significant values are at stake in the conflict under 
negotiation; he characterizes this as a matter of establishing “continuity.” This many 
Native Americans do as a matter of course when entering negotiations with 
archaeologists, and it is, in essence, what archaeologists recommend when they 
insist on the need to communicate clearly and publicly exactly what their goals are 
as archaeologists – what their interests are in archaeological sites and material. 
(Wylie 2005: 24) 
Mutual recognition and arguments of continuity provide a framework in which priority is given 
to understanding the harms, and the benefits, that may be associated with cultural 
appropriation in terms that matter to the affected parties. This is the basis for then designing 
a process for negotiating accommodations that take account of, even if they do not fully 
satisfy, the interests of all involved, subject to the principle that “what touches all should be 
agreed to by all” (Tully 1995: 122). 
To conclude, our aim in this chapter has been to draw attention to the harms that 
cultural appropriation may cause, even when they are well intentioned. We have noted that 
controversy about appropriation arises in connection both with tangible objects that have 
recognized economic value in the context of the appropriating culture and with intangible 
elements of cultural heritage that are more typically objects of appreciation or 
connoisseurship (e.g., performance and art practice, spirituality). In cases that most starkly 
illustrate the types of misapprehension with which we are centrally concerned, often what is 
at issue are fundamental differences in the conception of what counts as cultural heritage, 
what its significance is, and therefore how it should be treated. They key point here is that in 
many traditional societies there is no sharp separation of tangible from intangible property 
(as is typical in Western contexts); indeed, tangible heritage has no value or significance 
independent of the intangible heritage that gives it meaning. The salience of this distinction 
goes a long way toward explaining why, for example, the commodification of rock-art images 
on T-shirts and mugs is problematic not only (or primarily) because it represents an 
economic loss but because it also threatens to undermine cultural identity and well-being. An 
economic calculus of harms and benefits, reinforced by dominant (Western-Northern, Euro-
American) conceptions of property rights and their legal protection often works to obscure the 
dimensions of harm felt most acutely by indigenous communities, even when extended to the 
forms of intangible property recognized as having value under intellectual property law. 
Collaborative research is one means to address these challenges. Almost invariably 
it requires considerable investment of time and energy, and challenges practitioners to think 
outside the conventional horizons of their home disciplines and cultures, but the results can 
be enormously beneficial and mutually satisfying. Rather than treat collaborative work with 
descendant communities as a threat to the integrity of scientific research, as have some of its 
prominent detractors in archaeology, we join a growing number of colleagues who argue that 
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it stands to greatly enrich archaeology epistemically and conceptually (e.g., Atalay 2010; 
Colwell-Chanthaphonh et al. 2010 [in response to McGhee 2008]; Wylie 2009).30 
In this spirit we suggest that the key to understanding the value(s) of cultural heritage 
and to mitigating the harms of appropriation is to make respectful, mutually enriching cross-
cultural exchange an integral part of cultural heritage research practice. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Egyptian motifs and replica antiquities are found throughout Harrods department 
store in London, but they are showcased in the opulent Egyptian Room, designed for 
Mohamed Al-Fayed, then owner of Harrods. The question of appropriation is complicated 
by the fact that Al-Fayed is Egyptian by birth. Photo credit: George Nicholas. 
Figure 2. Inspired by ancient ceramics from Casas Grandes, Mata Ortiz pottery developed 
through the efforts of a single individual in the 1970s and subsequently become a 
community-wide “revival” that blends old and new forms. (Left) Fourteenth-century hooded 
effigy jar from Casas Grandes compared with (right) contemporary hooded effigy jar from 
Mata Ortiz. Private collection. Photo credit: Gordon Nicholas 
Figure 3. At the Sanilac Petroglyph site (ezhibiigaadek asin) in Michigan, the rock face 
containing more than one hundred images, or “teachings,” is cared for by Anishinabe 
women. A roof erected by the Michigan Park Service prevents rain from cleansing of the 
images. Photo courtesy of Sonya Atalay and the Ziibiwing Center of the Saginaw Chippewa 
Indian Tribe.  
 
Footnotes 
1 Efforts to protect these may clearly (and sometimes unnecessarily) hinder the development 
of new creative forms in music, art, and beyond (e.g., Aoki et al. 2008; Gaylor 2009; K. 
McLeod 2007). 
2 There are, of course, many examples of cross-cultural borrowing in which dominant 
cultures have been significantly shaped and, indeed, transformed by the traditions of 
those they have invaded, ruled, colonized, settled, or traded with. This is well documented 
in the Old World, where, for example, Egyptian culture influenced Greek culture, which in 
turn influenced Roman society, and where the Roman Empire took shape through a 
complex dynamic of exchange with subjugated indigenous cultures. 
3 Indeed, our chapter is weighted toward the effects of appropriation on Indigenous peoples 
for this reason. 
4 Here we invert the questions that frame James Young’s (2005, 2008) philosophical 
argument that, although some appropriations may be harmful or “profoundly offensive,” 
they are not inherently wrong, particularly where creative artistic production is concerned. 
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We share Young’s appreciation that a categorical condemnation of cultural appropriation 
cannot be sustained, but where the focus of his analysis is on defending cultural 
appropriation (in the spirit of those mentioned earlier who defend open access), we are 
concerned with exploring the range of harms and offense, the burdens imposed by 
appropriative practices, of which those engaged in appropriation should be mindful. 
5 In 1885, the Canadian government revised the Indian Act to ban the potlatch (Canada 
1885); the so-called potlatch law was rescinded only in 1951: “Every Indian or other 
person who engages in or assists in celebrating the Indian festival known as the ‘Potlatch’ 
or the Indian dance known as the ‘Tamanawas’ is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be 
liable to imprisonment for a term not more than six nor less than two months in a jail or 
other place of confinement; and, any Indian or other person who encourages, either 
directly or indirectly an Indian or Indians to get up such a festival or dance, or to celebrate 
the same, or who shall assist in the celebration of same is guilty of a like offence, and 
shall be liable to the same punishment.” The Sun Dance was also made illegal in 1895 by 
another amendment to the act (Canada 1895), also rescinded in 1951. 
6 We thank one referee for noting that the legal doctrine of terra nullius was not extensively 
used in North America; as Banner (2007) argues, the process was a complex one that 
turns on the imposition of a legal framework that legitimated land ownership and land 
transfer on terms set by European Americans. For purposes of this argument we take 
Whitt to be outlining a strategy of justification (moral and political) that figures in a number 
of contexts of appropriation, the logic of which is made explicit by the legal doctrine of 
terra nullius. 
7 However, as Hitchens’ (2008) notes, there were several occasions when the marbles were 
almost returned. See Young’s (2008: 72, 103) discussion of this case and his critique of 
the standard rescue argument defenses for their retention. 
8 Questions of ownership may be complicated by issues of private versus communal 
property, as well as by the fact that ownership of some items sold willingly in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century is today challenged. 
9 In these and other similar cases, such as the controversy surrounding James Neel’s 
research on the Yanomami (see Tierney 2000; also Kaestle and Horsburgh 2002), harm 
was clearly done to the communities involved. The reputations of those conducting the 
studies have been widely questioned, although often long after the event, but lingering 
concerns about the need to protect the interests of Indigenous peoples ultimately brought 
an end to the Human Genome Diversity Project (see Reardon 2005; also Hollowell and 
Nicholas 2009; Marks 2010). 
10 Protection of biological materials is sometimes based on complex legal principles, with 
sometimes surprising results. A famous case in which what would seem to be protected 
property is not is that of John Moore, who unsuccessfully claimed an ownership interest in 
a patent related to a cell line derived from his spleen (Boyle 1996). 
11 Several years ago, one of us (GN) was told by a very upset First Nations man from Alberta 
that “someone videotaped our Sun Dance and copyrighted it,” expressing great concern 
that the intellectual property of his people had been appropriated. This illustrates how 
incomplete or incorrect lay knowledge of intellectual property law may be but also that 
even the perception of appropriation can cause harm. 
 
13 This point is central to Banner (2007). 
14 Standard formulations are both prescriptive and proscriptive: “do unto others as you would 
have them do unto you,” and “do not do unto others what you would not have done to 
you.” 
15 This point is central to Young’s (2008) analysis of the ethics of cultural appropriation in the 
arts, and is evident in the diversity of viewpoints represented in Young and Brunk’s (2009) 
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edited volume The Ethics of Cultural Appropriation. See also Brown (2004); Nicholas and 
Bannister (2004a, 2004b); Nicholas and Hollowell 2006; and others. 
16 See Anderson 2005; Coleman 2005; Janke 2003), and Johnson 1996) for discussions of 
the types of impacts, and over prominent legal cases to restrict unauthorized use of rock 
art images, including the Brandl/Deaf Adder and Bulun Bulun v R & T Textiles Pty Ltd 
(1998) 157 ALR 193) cases. 
17 See VANOC’s press release on this, at http://fourhostfirstnations.com/a-historic-protocol-
for-the-four-host-first-nations-and-vanoc. For a critical review of this initiative, written in 
advance of the event, see O’Bonawain 2006. 
18 See online coverage of these stories:  Lisa Wade, ‘Russian Ice Skaters Impersonate 
Aboriginals, Win Gold’: http://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2010/01/23/russian-ice-
skaters-impersonate-aboriginals-win-gold/; Sonia Oxley, ‘Plushenko Marks His Territory 
with Gold’: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/21/us-figure-skating-european-
idUSTRE60K46320100121?type=sportsNews. 
19 Numerous newspaper articles are available documenting both the reaction of First Nations 
communities (e.g., http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2009/10/07/bc-
olympic-cowichan-sweater.html) and the resolution of the sweater controversy (e.g., 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2009/10/28/bc-cowichan-tribes-olympic-
sweater.html) 
20 See Damian Inwood (2009). 
21 Zena Pearlstone (2000) and others have examined issues of commodification associated 
with these forms of commercialization. 
22 Zia Pueblo launched legal challenges to the State of New Mexico and Southwest Airlines 
over their use of the image (see Nicholas and Bannister 2004a). 
23 The economics of Mata Ortiz pottery, and its competition, are discussed by Medina (2008). 
24 http://www.torfspa.com/about_moor.html. 
25 See, for example, the Tamaki Makau-rau Accord on the Display of Human Remains and 
Sacred Objects (http://www.worldarchaeologicalcongress.org/about-wac/codes-of-
ethics/169-tamaki-makau-rau-accord). 
26 See Gabriel 2010. 
27 This seven-year international collaboration consists of more than fifty archaeologists, 
lawyers, anthropologists, museum specialists, ethicists, and other specialists from eight 
countries, along with twenty-five partnering organizations. The project is funded by the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. For more information, see 
http://www.sfu.ca/ipinch. 
28 HCPO Policy and Research, Hopi Tribe:  
http://www.nptao.arizona.edu/research/docs/Hopi_Cultural_Preservation_Office.pdf 
29 There are several compilations of essays on archaeological practice that identify 
methodological, ethical, and other helpful resources, as well as provide examples of their 
application (e.g., Bell and Napoleon 2008; Bell and Paterson 2009; Hollowell and Carr 
2009; Nicholas et al. 2009, 2010; Rizvi and Lydon 2010). Also see Bannister and Barrett’s 
(2006) relevant discussion on the precautionary principle. 
30 We acknowledge the potential of the growing literature on cosmopolitanism (Appiah 
2006b) as a resource for identifying a variety of ways to negotiate the space between the 
end points of the spectrum of heritage valuation – cultural distinctiveness and cultural 
unity (e.g., Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2009; Meskell 2009), but adequately addressing its 
promise (and problems) is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
